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ABSTRACT 
Salmon is an anadromous species that during its feeding and spawning migrations is sought after catch for 
commercial  and  recreational  fisheries.  The  management  of  salmon  fisheries  is  complicated  by  the 
combination of mixed and single stock fisheries. Thus, the country of origin has sovereign control over 
harvest of a salmon stock only at the last steps of the gauntlet. This paper addresses the stability of an 
international fisheries agreement on the Baltic salmon. This setting is modeled through a coalition game 
in  the  partition  function  form  with  four  asymmetric  players.  Countries  payoffs  depend  both  on 
commercial fishery’s profits and net benefits from recreational harvest. Moreover, the country of origin 
must ensure that each of the salmon stocks achieve or maintain a sustainable size. The economic sub-
model is calibrated using commercial fisheries statistics and existing non-market valuation studies. The 
underlying population dynamics model accounts for 15 salmon stocks and it is used in the actual stock 
assessment.  The  results  indicate  that  by  considering  economic  aspects  of  recreational  fisheries  it  is 
possible to stabilize the grand coalition. However, the cooperative strategies of the grand coalition do not 
ensure biologically sound harvesting of all salmon stocks.  
 
INTRODUCTION  
The literature on international fisheries agreements (IFAs) shows the Paradox of the Global Commons 
[1], that is, the higher the benefits from cooperation the harder it is to achieve a successful agreement. 
This is due to the existence of positive externalities on coalition formation, which means that free riders 
benefit from others cooperating and aiming at sustainable harvesting. The present paper contributes to this 
literature  by  studying  the  impact  of  non-market  values  on  the  stability  of  international  fisheries 
agreements.  It  has  been  shown  that,  in  the  presence  of  transfers  between  members  of  an  IFA,  the 
existence of asymmetries between players increases the prospects of cooperationa. For instance, [2] show 
that both partial and full cooperation can be achieved, depending on the number of players, asymmetry IIFET 2012 Tanzania Proceedings 
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and efficiency levels. In this paper we model the stability of an IFA on the salmon fisheries in the Baltic 
Sea  through  a  four-player  game  of  coalition  formation.  Two  players  (Denmark  and  Poland)  have  a 
commercial  fleet  only,  whereas  the  others  (Finland  and  Sweden)  have  both  commercial  fleet  and 
substantial recreational fisheries. The recreational benefits are an extra source of asymmetry between 
players and increase the aggregate net benefits from the salmon fishery.   
BIOECONOMIC MODEL 
The game theoretical analysis presented here builds on the model by [3]. We adjust their counterfactual 
analysis by projecting the fishery forward, accounting for the recreational fisheries and updating the 
commercial fleet description with the latest regulations. Moreover, the population dynamic model, which 
accounts for 15 wild salmon stocks, is populated by the parameter values from the latest stock assessment 
[4].  The commercial fleet profits follow the functional forms and estimates adopted from [3]. The four 
players of the game are Poland (PL), Denmark (DK), Finland (FI) and Sweden (SE). Poland and Denmark 
harvest salmon in winter using longlines (LL). Finland harvest salmon using longlines and trapnets (TN) 
and the Swedish commercial fleet applies only trapnets. Finland and Sweden have also recreational (RI) 
fisheries that target salmon in their home rivers where the salmon reproduces. Recreational fisheries 
harvest what has escaped from the commercial fisheries. The salmon that escapes recreational fishery 
spawns and dies after it. Due to the migration routes the number of salmon available to each fleet is 
different and thus each fleet has a different effect on the dynamics of each salmon stock (Table I).  
Table I: Fleet structure of each country and the target salmon stocks of each fleet. The stocks with 
recreational fisheries are shown in bold. 
Salmon stock 
PL  DK  FI  SE 
LL  LL  LL  TN  RI  TN  RI 
Tornionjoki  x  x  x  x  x    x 
Simojoki  x  x  x  x  x     
Kalixälven  x  x  x  x      x 
Råneälven  x  x  x  x       
Piteälven  x  x  x  x    x   
Åbyälven  x  x  x  x    x   
Byskeälven  x  x  x  x    x  x 
Rickleån  x  x  x  x    x   
Sävarån  x  x  x  x    x   
Ume/Vindelälven  x  x  x  x    x  x 
Öreälven  x  x  x  x    x   
Lögdeälven  x  x  x  x    x   
Ljungan  x  x  x  x    x   
Mörrumsån  x  x  x        x 
Emån  x  x  x         
Recreational net benefits 
In modeling the net benefits of the recreational harvest we assume a linear marginal willingness to pay 
(WTP) for recreational harvest and in order to estimate the individual net benefit function, compute the 
integral  of  the  estimated  marginal  WTP  between  the  current  and  improved  catch  levels  [5].  These IIFET 2012 Tanzania Proceedings 
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individual net benefits are then aggregated across the approximate angler population to obtain parameters 
of the aggregated net benefit function: NB=kH-vH
2, where H, is the salmon catch and k and v functional 
parameters. Based on existing contingent valuation studies we take the WTP estimates for rivers Simojoki 
[6], Tornionjoki (both in the Finnish and the Swedish side) [7], Byskeälven [8], and Ume/Vindelälven [9]. 
Moreover, we assume that the number of anglers and anglers preferences in rivers Kalixälven and in 
Mörrumsån are similar to those in Tornio (Swedish side) and Byskeälven, respectively. Table II presents 
the parameters of the net benefit function for each river. 
Table II: Parameters of the river fisheries net benefit functions. 
  k  v 
Byskeälven  11.52  0.0006 
Simojoki  46.54  0.0062 
Torniojoki, Finland  22.51  0.0004 
Torniojoki, Sweden  24.43  0.0027 
Ume/Vindelälven  3.89  0.0022 
COALITION FORMATION GAME 
We use a coalition game in the partition function form to study which kind of international agreements 
between the four countries are possible to form. A partition function assigns a value to each coalition (see 
rows named as ‘Partition’ in the Tables III-V). In our game, a coalition can consist of one to four players 
and its objective is to maximize its economic net benefits from the fishery. The coalition members play 
cooperatively within the coalition. This means that they share the aggregate worth of the coalition. We 
apply the Almost Ideal Sharing Scheme (AISS) that allocates to each coalition member its free rider 
payoff plus a share of the coalition surplus (rows named as ‘Valuation’ in the Tables  III-V) [10]. The 
coalition  plays  non-cooperatively  against  non-members.  That  is,  the  coalition  maximizes  its  benefits 
while knowing that the free riders, singleton(s), are maximizing theirs. As explained earlier, one key 
characteristic of fishery games is positive externalities. Thus, we test if that applies to our game, by 
checking if the free rider payoffs increase when coalitions are formed. For example, we compare the 
payoff of Poland and Denmark in a case where all four countries are singletons (see Table III, coalition 
structure 1) to their payoffs when Finland and Sweden merge (see Table III, coalition structure 2). If the 
non-members payoffs increase when coalitions are formed, considering all possible coalitions, then the 
game exhibits positive externalities. To test the stability of coalitions we use the concepts of internal and 
external stability. A coalition is internally stable (IS) if none of the members finds it optimal to leave the 
coalition. It is externally stable (ES) if none of the non-members finds it optimal to join the coalition. 
Coalition is stable if it is both internally and externally stable.  
RESULTS 
We analyze three scenarios which are explained below. Common to all scenarios is that the strategies 
shown in the Tables III-V are the Nash equilibrium strategies with respect to the reported fishing efforts 
in year 2010. That is, these are constant effort strategies during the simulation period, 2011-2030, which 
correspond to a proportion of the effort level in the base year (2010). The partition and value functions are 
presented in thousands of Euros. A common result to each scenario is that the game exhibit positive 
externalities. 
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Scenario1: Commercial fisheries only 
In the Scenario 1 (S1) the objective function of each country includes only the net present value of the 
commercial  fisheries  profits  in  years  2011-2030  and  the  strategy  space  of  each  country  includes 
commercial  effort.  The  results  show  that  the  total  payoffs  under  non-cooperation  and  under  grand 
coalition are 18.8MEUR and 55.9MEUR, respectively (Table III). However, the grand coalition is not 
stable. The highest total payoff under a stable agreement is 48.1MEUR, which would be a result of an 
agreement between Poland, Denmark and Finland (coalition structure 10, C10). Under this agreement 
Finland would undertake all the harvest of the coalition and share the profits of the commercial fishery 
among all the three coalition members according to the AISS.  
Scenario 2: Recreational net benefits included, but the recreational fisheries are not part of the 
strategy space 
In the Scenario 2 (S2) the objective function of Poland and Denmark includes the net present value of the 
commercial fisheries profits. The objective function of Finland includes the net present value of the LL 
and TN profits and the net benefits from the rivers Simojoki and Tornionjoki recreational fisheries. The 
objective function of Sweden includes the net present value of TN profits and the net benefits from 
recreational fisheries of river Tornionojoki, river Kalixälven, River Byskeälven, River Ume/Vindelälven 
and river Mörrumsån. The strategy space of each country includes only commercial effort. The results 
show that in the non-cooperative game (C1), it would be optimal for Sweden not to harvest at all in the 
commercial fishery and  earn net benefits from the recreational fisheries yielding 31.5MEUR (Table IV). 
The grand coalition (C12) is stable and its optimal strategy, leading to an aggregate payoff of 139MEUR, 
is to stop commercial fishery and keep the river fishery effort constant. 
Scenario 3: Recreational net benefits included, and the recreational fisheries are part of the 
strategy space 
In the Scenario 3 (S3) the objective functions are the same to those in Scenario 2, but the recreational 
fisheries are included now in the strategy space. The Nash equilibrium strategies for the Finnish and 
Swedish  recreational  fisheries  are  shown  in  parenthesis  (Table  V).  The  results  show  that  the  grand 
coalition is stable and Sweden would be the only harvester. The Nash equilibrium strategies for Swedish 
commercial and recreational fisheries are 3.8 and 1.9 times the level of the base year, respectively. The 
value of grand coalition is 253.6 MEUR. 
Implications for salmon stocks  
Figure 1 illustrates the number of juvenile salmon (smolts) under the different scenarios and coalition 
structures.  The  present  management  objective  of  achieving  75%  of  the  potential  smolt  production 
capacity is shown by the horizontal dotted line. The results show that non-cooperative solution (C1) 
yields less smolts than stable cooperative solutions under all scenarios (S1-S3). In the long run, rivers 
Torninojoki,  Kalixälven  and  Ume/Vindelälven  will  achieve  the  management  objective  under  all  the 
shown options. In terms of the smolt production target, the grand coalition under the scenario 2 (S2/C12) 
would be the best. This option would stop the commercial fishery and maintain the recreational fishery 
effort at its present level. However, in economic terms the best agreement would be the grand coalition 
under the scenario 3 (S3/C12).  This outcome would nearly double the recreational fishing effort in the 
Swedish rivers. As a consequence, given the present management objective, this would be too high effort 
for river Mörrumsån.  IIFET 2012 Tanzania Proceedings 
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Table III: Results of the Scenario 1. Coalition strategies and stable coalition structures are shown 
shaded. 
1)  Commercial fisheries only 
Coalition structure    Poland   Denmark  Finland   Sweden  Total  IS  ES 
1  PL,DK,FI,SE 
Strategy  1.8  2.6  3.2  1.2 
18762  yes  yes  Valuation  5576  495  11594  1098 
Partition  5576  495  11594  1098 
2  (FI,SE) 
Strategy  1.8  2.8  3.4  0 
20965  yes  yes  Valuation  5808  633  12510  2014 
Partition  5808  633  14524  0 
3  (DK,FI) 
Strategy  1.8  0  3.6  1.4 
23104  yes  no  Valuation  6581  1758  12857  1909 
Partition  6581  14615  0  1909 
4  (PL,FI) 
Strategy  0  6.6  3.8  2.4 
30520  yes  yes  Valuation  6893  4745  12911  5971 
Partition  19804  4745  0  5971 
5  (DK,SE) 
Strategy  1.8  0  3.4  1.6 
22993  yes  no  Valuation  6656  838  14059  1441 
Partition  6656  2278  14059  0 
6  (PL,SE) 
Strategy  0  6.4  4  2.4 
30369  no  yes  Valuation  5033  4556  20226  555 
Partition  5587  4556  20226  0 
7  (DK,PL) 
Strategy  1.8  0  3.6  1.4 
23104  yes  no  Valuation  5831  750  14615  1909 
Partition  6581  0  14615  1909 
8  (FI,SE,DK) 
Strategy  2  0  3.6  0 
24014  yes  yes  Valuation  7182  710  14136  1986 
Partition  7182  16832  0  0 
9  (PL,FI,SE) 
Strategy  0  7.2  3.8  0.4 
33137  no  yes  Valuation  4274  5732  18693  4438 
Partition  27405  5732  0  0 
10  (PL,DK,FI) 
Strategy  0  0  3.8  4.2 
48097  yes  yes  Valuation  7419  5584  15453  19640 
Partition  28457  0  0  19640 
11  (PL,DK,SE) 
Strategy  0  0  4.6  3.8 
45501  yes  yes  Valuation  7204  5104  30735  2457 
Partition  14766  0  30735  0 
12  (PL,DK,FI,SE) 
Strategy  0  0  0.8  4.6 
55887  no  yes  Valuation  5331  3882  28885  17790 
Partition  55887  0  0  0 
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Table IV: Results of the Scenario 2. Coalition strategies and stable coalition structures are shown 
shaded. 
2)  Recreational net benefits included, but recreational fishery is not part of the strategy space 
Coalition structure    Poland   Denmark  Finland   Sweden  Total  IS  ES 
1  PL,DK,FI,SE 
Strategy  2  3.8  1.20  0 
64293  yes  yes  Valuation  6876  1082  24795  31540 
Partition  6876  1082  24795  31540 
2  (FI,SE) 
Strategy  2.2  4  0  0 
69284  yes  no  Valuation  7605  1160  26887  33632 
Partition  7605  1160  60520  0 
3  (DK,FI) 
Strategy  2.2  0  1.60  0 
69667  yes  no  Valuation  8839  2456  26169  32203 
Partition  8839  28625  0  32203 
4  (PL,FI) 
Strategy  0  8  2.40  0.6 
80109  yes  no  Valuation  9687  7076  27605  35742 
Partition  37291  7076  0  35742 
5  (DK,SE) 
Strategy  2.2  0  1.60  0 
69667  no  no  Valuation  8839  873  28625  31330 
Partition  8839  32203  28625  0 
6  (PL,SE) 
Strategy  0  8  2.40  0.6 
80109  no  no  Valuation  5539  7076  37291  30203 
Partition  35742  7076  37291  0 
7  (DK,PL) 
Strategy  2.2  0  1.60  0 
69667  yes  no  Valuation  7316  1522  28625  32203 
Partition  8839  0  28625  32203 
8  (FI,SE,DK) 
Strategy  2.20  0  0  0 
81870  yes  no  Valuation  10151  4404  31869  35446 
Partition  10151  71719  0  0 
9  (PL,FI,SE) 
Strategy  0  9.6  0  0 
96938  yes  no  Valuation  9724  9941  39411  37862 
Partition  86997  9941  0  0 
10  (PL,DK,FI) 
Strategy  0  0  3.40  2.40 
98363  yes  no  Valuation  10674  8911  30461  48317 
Partition  50046  0  0  48317 
11  (PL,DK,SE) 
Strategy  0  0  3.40  2.40 
98363  yes  no  Valuation  8906  7142  50046  32269 
Partition  48317  0  50046  0 
12  (PL,DK,FI,SE) 
Strategy  0  0  0  0 
139165  yes  yes  Valuation  15329  15119  55223  53495 
Partition  139165  0  0  0 
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Table V: Results of the Scenario 3. Coalition strategies and stable coalition structures are shown 
shaded. 
3) Recreational fisheries is included in the strategy space 
Coalition structure    Poland   Denmark  Finland   Sweden  Total  IS  ES 
1  PL,DK,FI,SE  Strategy  1.4  1.8  3 (1.5)  3.4 (1.7)  84296  yes  yes 
Valuation  4113  262  20245  59676 
Partition  4113  262  20245  59676 
2  (FI,SE)  Strategy  1.8  2.8  0 (0)  3.6 (1.8)  113333  yes  no 
Valuation  5812  635  33727  73158 
Partition  5812  635  106886  0 
3  (DK,FI)  Strategy  1.6  0  3 (1.5)  3.4 (1.7)  88339  yes  no 
Valuation  4976  627  20609  62127 
Partition  4976  21236  0  62127 
4  (PL,FI)  Strategy  0  5.4  3.4 (1.7)  3.4 (1.7)  114530  yes  no 
Valuation  7906  3277  24038  79310 
Partition  31943  3277  0  79310 
5  (DK,SE)  Strategy  1.6  0  3 (1.5)  3.4 (1.7)  88339  yes  no 
Valuation  4976  1357  21236  60770 
Partition  4976  62127  21236  0 
6  (PL,SE)  Strategy  0  5  3.4 (1.7)  3.6 (1.8)  115817  yes  no 
Valuation  13101  2876  31176  68664 
Partition  81764  2876  31176  0 
7  (DK,PL)  Strategy  1.6  0  3.4 (1.7)  3.4 (1.7)  88339  yes  no 
Valuation  4413  563  21236  62127 
Partition  4976  0  21236  62127 
8  (FI,SE,DK)  Strategy  1.8  0  0  3.6 (1.8)  134069  yes  no 
Valuation  7441  14845  35446  76337 
Partition  7441  126628  0  0 
9  (PL,FI,SE)  Strategy  0  7.6  0  3.6 (1.8)  165617  yes  no 
Valuation  20022  6689  45386  93520 
Partition  158928  6689  0  0 
10  (PL,DK,FI)  Strategy  0  0  3.8 (1.9)  3.6 (1.8)  155624  yes  no 
Valuation  10963  9264  27223  108174 
Partition  47450  0  0  108174 
11  (PL,DK,SE)  Strategy  0  0  3.8 (1.9)  3.6 (1.8)  155624  yes  no 
Valuation  17708  15608  47450  74858 
Partition  108174  0  47450  0 
12  (PL,DK,FI,SE)  Strategy  0  0  0 (0)  3.8 (1.9)  253609  yes  yes 
Valuation  28405  27653  68414  129137 
Partition  253609  0  0  0 
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Figure 1. The number of smolts under different scenarios (S) and stable coalition structures (C).The 
horizontal dotted lines shows the 75% of the estimated median smolt production capacity (ICES 2012).IIFET 2012 Tanzania Proceedings 
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
The present paper studies the impact of non-market values on the stability of an international fisheries 
agreement. The preliminary results show that despite the existence of positive externalities accounting 
recreational benefits increases the chances of stable grand coalition. Thus the results support the earlier 
findings in the IFA literature according to which the more asymmetric the players are the more successful 
cooperation, given that a transfer scheme exists. Though the recreational benefits help to achieve stable 
grand  coalition  and  increase  the  economic  benefits  from  the  fishery  substantially,  the  biological 
management objective is not fully met. The result presented here are preliminary and more computational 
power is needed to study how robust the results are for the changes in parameter values. A worthwhile 
extension would be a game setting where recreational and commercial fisheries would be the players.   
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